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Note
Sommer v. Federal Signal Corp.: Clarifying
the Confusion Over the Tort/Contract
Borderland and the Rules of Contribution
I. Introduction
"And the Lord said: Let there be contracts and Let there be
torts. And it was so. And He divided contracts from torts."'
Unfortunately, there is not always such a clear and divine divi-
sion between contract and tort. In fact, there is a confusing
area where contract and tort mesh termed the tort/contract bor-
derland.2 Sommer v. Federal Signal Corp.,3 a recent New York
Court of Appeals decision, involved an action that implicated
both tort and contract law.4 Thus, the court had to determine if
it would allow claims in tort, claims in contract, or both.5 The
court ultimately held that claims in tort and in contract arose
from the facts.6
In Sommer, a fire alarm monitoring service company at-
tempted to escape both direct and contributive liability for its
acts by claiming as a defense an exculpatory clause in a contract
between the monitoring service and a building owner.7 The
1. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADTION DECIDING APPEAIs 346
n.315(b) (1960).
2. Rich v. New York Cent. & Hudson River R.R., 87 N.Y. 382, 390 (1882) (ex-
plaining that tort and/or contract claims could be brought where the facts give rise
to both actions, and separation of the facts into neat categories of tort and contract
is difficult).
3. 79 N.Y.2d 540, 593 N.E.2d 1365, 583 N.Y.S.2d 957 (1992).
4. Id. at 550-51, 593 N.E.2d at 1368, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 960.
5. Id. at 551, 593 N.E.2d at 1369, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 961.
6. Id. at 553, 593 N.E.2d at 1370, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 962.
7. Id. at 549, 593 N.E.2d at 1368, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 960.
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plaintiffs alleged that the acts of alarm-related defendants,8 in
combination with the acts of the alarm monitoring service,
caused a delay which allowed a small, containable fire to grow
into an uncontrollable blaze. 9 The New York Court of Appeals
held that the exculpatory clause was to be effective to insulate
against ordinary negligence.10 However, the exculpatory clause
was unenforceable against claims of gross negligence," due to
the important public interest of having competent fire alarm
monitoring services. 12
The court also analyzed the contribution claims asserted by
alarm-related defendants and the building owner in light of the
court's determination that the monitoring service had a duty to
the building owner, and that the exculpatory clause defense was
enforceable only against ordinary negligence.' 3 The court held
that ordinary negligence would trigger the alarm-related de-
fendants' contribution claim against the monitoring service.' 4
However, where the building owner was seeking contribution
from the monitoring service if found liable to tenants, only gross
negligence would allow the contribution claim.15
Part II of this Note will discuss the development of the tort]
contract borderland, contractual exculpatory clauses and claims
for contribution. Part III will discuss Sommer v. Federal Signal
Corp. Part IV will analyze how the decision in Sommer helped
to clarify the confusion surrounding both the borderland and
the rules of contribution, especially where multiple parties, con-
tracts, and claims are involved. Part V will argue that by al-
lowing the contribution claims to the extent that public policy
permitted, the court's decision in Sommer allowed our adver-
sarial judicial system to provide justice to both injured parties
and joint tortfeasors.
8. "Alarm-related defendants" is a term used to refer to those defendant enti-
ties related to the fire detection system, including designers, manufacturers, parts
suppliers, installers and inspectors. Id.
9. Id. The fire resulted in damages exceeding $7 million. Id.
10. Id. at 554, 593 N.E.2d at 1370, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 963.
11. Id. at 554, 593 N.E.2d at 1371, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 963.
12. Id. at 552, 593 N.E.2d at 1370, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 962.
13. Id. at 558, 593 N.E.2d at 1373, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 965-66.
14. Id. at 560, 593 N.E.2d at 1374, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 967.
15. Id.
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II. Background
A. Tort/Contract Borderland
In many cases it is clear whether an action is one in tort or
one in contract. However, "b]etween actions plainly ex con-
tractu'6 and those as clearly ex delicto'7 there exists... a bor-
der-land, where the lines of distinction are shadowy and
obscure, and the tort and the contract so approach each other,
and become so nearly coincident as to make their practical sepa-
ration somewhat difficult." 8 This tort/contract borderland situ-
ation arises where there is duty between parties because of a
relationship which was created by contract. 19 "Negligence, con-
sidered merely as a tort, is a wrong independent of contract, but
negligence may also be a breach of contract if the contract itself
calls for care."20
Classification of an action as sounding in tort or in contract
can prove to be consequential. This classification can affect ju-
risdiction,2' the applicable statute of limitations,22 the appropri-
16. An action ex contractu is defined as a cause of action "from or out of a
contract." BLACes LAW DIcTIoNARY 566 (6th ed. 1990); Eads v. Marks, 249 P.2d
257, 260 (Cal. 1952) (an action ex contractu arises from a breach of a promise set
forth in a contract).
17. An action ex delicto is defined as a cause of action which is "founded upon
a wrong or a tort." BLACes LAw DICTIONARY 567 (6th ed. 1990).
18. Rich v. New York Cent. & Hudson River R.R., 87 N.Y. 382, 390 (1882)
(holding that an action in tort could be pleaded even though the facts also give rise
to an action in contract).
19. Peter W. Thornton, Note, The Elastic Concept of Tort and Contract as Ap-
plied by the Courts of New York, 14 BROOK. L. REv. 196, 196 (1948) (discussing the
development of the tort/contract borderland).
20. Lord Elec. Co. v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co., 226 N.Y. 427, 432, 123 N.E.
756, 757 (1919) (holding that a subcontractor who negligently caused a fire could
be liable for damages to property under both contract and tort principles).
21. See Busch v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co., 187 N.Y. 388, 389-90, 80
N.E. 197, 197 (1907) (plaintiff, by suing in contract, was under proper jurisdiction
in the Municipal Court of the City of New York, a court of limited jurisdiction, even
though the wrongful act also amounted to an action for the tort of assault and
battery, an action over which the municipal court did not have jurisdiction).
22. See In re Paver & Wildfoerster, 38 N.Y.2d 669, 672, 345 N.E.2d 565, 566,
382 N.Y.S.2d 22, 23 (1976) (plaintiff's claims, although cognizable in either con-
tract or tort, were timely where asserted within the six year period of limitations
for contracts); Lewis v. Dunbar & Sullivan Dredging Co., 178 Misc. 980, 981-82, 36
N.Y.S.2d 897, 898-99 (Sup. Ct. Oswego County 1942) (plaintiff sued in contract to
receive the benefit of a six-year statute of limitations, rather than in tort which
had a three-year statute of limitations). See generally Gregory D. Zahs, Note, San-
tulli v. Englert, Reilly & McHugh, P.C.: The New York Court of Appeals Pounds
3
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ate measure of damages 23 and the availability of contribution.24
Courts have noted that "a contracting party may be
charged with a separate tort liability arising from a breach of a
duty distinct from, or in addition to, the breach of contract."2 5 A
simple breach of contract will not qualify as an action in tort
"unless a legal duty independent of the contract itself has been
violated."26 Thus, where a contract governs a particular subject
matter, an action in tort would be precluded for events arising
from the same subject matter.27 However, a legal duty may
arise from extraneous circumstances not specifically stated in,
but nonetheless related to, the contract.28
For example, public policy may impose a legal duty to use
reasonable care because of the nature of the services to be per-
formed in the contractual relationship. 29 Although the relation-
Another Nail in the Coffin of CPLR Section 214(6), 13 PACE L. REV. 721 (1993).
23. See Miller v. Foltis Fisher Inc., 152 Misc. 24, 272 N.Y.S. 712 (Sup. Ct. App.
T. 1st Dep't 1934) (although plaintiff recovered for personal injuries, plaintiff was
also entitled to interest on the recovery because the court viewed the claim as one
in contract).
24. See Board of Educ. v. Sargent, Webster, Crenshaw & Folley, 71 N.Y.2d 21,
517 N.E.2d 1360, 523 N.Y.S.2d 475 (1988) (holding that, under New York law,
contribution is unavailable in contract cases).
25. North Shore Bottling Co. v. Schmidt & Sons, 22 N.Y.2d 171, 179, 239
N.E.2d 189, 193, 292 N.Y.S.2d 86, 92 (1968) (recognizing that an action in tort did
arise where the defendant conspired with others to cheat and defraud plaintiff of
his exclusive beer distribution business, despite defendant's ability to sue in con-
tract); see also Rich, 87 N.Y. at 398 (despite the availability of a contract action,
the court recognized a tort action where the defendant willfully and fraudulently
violated its contract with plaintiff); Albermarle Theatre v. Bayberry Realty Corp.,
27 A-D.2d 172, 176, 277 N.Y.S.2d 505, 511 (1st Dep't 1967) (finding that defendant
lessees' conduct in conspiring to destroy lessor's interest in a theater constituted a
breach of contract); Schisgall v. Fairchild Publications, 207 Misc. 224, 230, 137
N.Y.S.2d 312, 317 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1955) (stating that, although an inten-
tional breach of contract does not create a tort liability, an intentional infliction of
injury in relation to a breach of contract is tortious).
26. Clark-Fitzpatrick, Inc. v. Long Island R.R., 70 N.Y.2d 382, 389, 516
N.E.2d 190, 193, 521 N.Y.S.2d 653, 656 (1987) (holding that the existence of a
contract governing particular subject matter would preclude recovery in quasi con-
tract or tort for events arising from the same subject matter); see also Rich, 87 N.Y.
at 390.
27. Clark-Fitzpatrick, 70 N.Y.2d at 389, 516 N.E.2d at 194, 521 N.Y.S.2d at
656-57.
28. Id.; see also Rich, 87 N.Y. at 398.
29. Sommer, 79 N.Y.2d at 551-52, 593 N.E.2d at 1369, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 961.
546
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ships of bailor-bailee, 30 carrier-passenger 3 l and innkeeper-
guest 32 arise from contracts, the courts have imposed a duty to
exercise due care in the protection of person and property.33
This duty is based on considerations of public policy that are
imposed above and beyond the contract. If in these relation-
ships there is a failure of the duty to exercise due care, the
bailor, carrier or innkeeper would be subject to tort liability.34
In addition to Sommer v. Federal Signal Corp. ,5 many of
the cases discussed in this Note involve alarm monitoring com-
panies.36 These companies, as with a bailor or a carrier, per-
form a service that implicates public policy, giving rise to a duty
of care that transcends any contractual relationship. 37 The
courts consider public policy because of the potentially cata-
strophic consequences of failing to perform competently. 38
The New York courts have also examined the nature of the
injury, the manner in which the injury occurred and the recov-
ery for the resulting harm, in their attempts to shed light on the
tort/contract borderland.39 Where the injury is to person or
30. Sherber v. Kinney Systems, 42 Misc. 2d 530, 248 N.Y.S.2d 437 (Civ. Ct.
N.Y. County 1964) (holding that failure of bailee to properly guard against unlaw-
ful entry into a garage constituted negligence of bailee, allowing an action in tort).
31. Eisman v. Port Authority Trans Hudson Corp., 96 Misc. 2d 678, 409
N.Y.S.2d 578 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1978) (holding that, where passenger could
demonstrate an assumption of a duty to provide safe, secure and adequate protec-
tion by carrier, a failure of that duty would constitute a tort).
32. Friedman v. Shindler's Prairie House, Inc., 224 A.D. 232, 230 N.Y.S. 44
(3d Dep't 1928) (holding that innkeeper may be liable in tort to guest where inn-
keeper fails to exercise reasonable care for safety of guest).
33. Thornton, supra note 19, at 197.
34. See id.; see also supra notes 30-32.
35. 79 N.Y.2d 540, 593 N.E.2d 1365, 583 N.Y.S.2d 957 (1992).
36. See, e.g., Eaves Brooks Costume Co. v. Y.B.H. Realty Corp., 76 N.Y.2d 220,
556 N.E.2d 1093, 557 N.Y.S.2d 286 (1990); Florence v. Merchants Cent. Alarm Co.,
51 N.Y.2d 793, 412 N.E.2d 1317, 433 N.Y.S.2d 91 (1980); Melodee Lane Lingerie
Co. v. American Dist. Tel. Co., 18 N.Y.2d 57, 218 N.E.2d 661, 271 N.Y.S.2d 937
(1966); World Trade Knitting Mills v. Lido Knitting Mills, 154 A.D.2d 99, 551
N.Y.S.2d 930 (1st Dep't 1990); Appliance Assoc. v. Dyce-Lymen Sprinkler, 123
A.D.2d 512, 507 N.Y.S.2d 104 (4th Dep't 1986).
37. Sommer, 79 N.Y.2d at 553, 593 N.E.2d at 1370, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 962.
38. Id.
39. See, e.g., Bellevue S. Assocs. v. H.R.H. Constr. Corp., 78 N.Y.2d 282, 293,
579 N.E.2d 195, 200, 574 N.Y.S.2d 165, 170 (1991). In Bellevue, the court found
that delamination of tiles could not be classified as a tort because: there was no
injury to person or property; the injury was a gradual process of the product failing
to perform as anticipated rather than a cataclysmic occurrence; and the recovery
5
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property rather than solely to a product, the wrong bears an
indicia of a tort.40 Where there is an abrupt, cataclysmic occur-
rence, rather than a process 41 of failure of the product to per-
form, there is an indication of tort.42 And where the recovery is
for damages other than the replacement of the product, there is
also an indication of tort.43 The idea behind examining these
factors is to determine whether the party has been injured due
to failure to exercise due care (an action in tort), or whether the
party is merely seeking to enforce a bargain (an action in
contract).44
Until recently, the New York courts have dealt with the
tort/contract borderland by distinguishing between misfea-
sance, which is improper performance of an act 45 sounding in
tort, and nonfeasance, which is nonperformance of an act 46
sounding in contract.47 The distinction between misfeasance
and nonfeasance was justified on the grounds that, once a per-
son has assumed to act, he becomes subject to the duty to act
with due care. 48 Unfortunately, the misfeasance and nonfea-
for the resulting harm was simply replacement of the tiles. Id. at 282, 294, 579
N.E.2d at 195, 200, 574 N.Y.S.2d at 166, 170.
40. Id. at 294, 579 N.E.2d at 200, 574 N.Y.S.2d at 170.
41. Process is defined as "[a] series of actions, motions, or occurrences ...
whereby a result or effect is produced." BLAciKs LAw DICTIONARY 1205 (6th ed.
1990).
42. Bellevue, 78 N.Y.2d at 294, 579 N.E.2d at 200, 574 N.Y.S.2d at 170.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 294-95, 579 N.E.2d at 200, 574 N.Y.S.2d at 170.
45. Misfeasance is defined as the "improper performance of some act which a
person may lawfully do." BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 1000 (6th ed. 1990).
46. Nonfeasance is defined as the "[n]onperformance of some act which [a]
person is obligated or has [a] responsibility to perform." BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY
1054 (6th ed. 1990).
47. Eaves Brooks Costume Co. v. Y.B.H. Realty Corp., 76 N.Y.2d 220, 225-26,
556 N.E.2d 1093, 1095, 557 N.Y.S.2d 286, 288 (1990). "[A] number of lower courts
have held that sprinkler maintenance and alarm companies can be liable to non-
contracting parties only for misfeasance in the performance of the contract and
that the failure to detect flaws in a sprinkler system or the failure of the alarm
system is nonfeasance." Id. (citations omitted); see also World Trade Knitting
Mills v. Lido Knitting Mills, 154 A.D.2d 99, 551 N.Y.S.2d 930 (1st Dep't 1990) (the
alleged acts of negligence including failure to inspect alarm system and failure to
respond to alarm system, were found to constitute nonfeasance rather than misfea-
sance and, therefore, only an action in contract was permitted); Appliance Assoc. v.
Dyce-Lymen Sprinkler Co., 123 A.D.2d 512, 507 N.Y.S.2d 104 (4th Dep't 1986)
(failure of alarm company to receive or respond to alarm which would have acti-
vated sprinkler system constituted nonfeasance rather than misfeasance).
48. Eaves, 76 N.Y.2d at 226, 556 N.E.2d at 1096, 557 N.Y.S.2d at 289.
548
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sance labels confused the tort/contract borderland even further
because the distinction was often unclear and led to illogical
conclusions. 49
In Eaves Brooks Costume Co. v. Y.B.H. Realty Corp.,50 a
commercial tenant sued two companies that were under con-
tract with the landlord to inspect and maintain a sprinkler sys-
tem that malfunctioned and damaged the tenant's property.5'
Although the New York Court of Appeals affirmed the lower
court's dismissal of the complaint, which was based on the dis-
tinction between misfeasance and nonfeasance, the court specif-
ically rejected those labels as a basis for attaching liability.5 2
Rather, it held that both failing to act (nonfeasance) and defec-
tively acting (misfeasance) may beget a tort cause of action if
the defendant assumed a duty of due care.53 "[T]he proper in-
quiry is simply whether the defendant has assumed a duty to
exercise reasonable care to prevent foreseeable harm to the
plaintiff."5 4 Where a party has assumed a duty to exercise rea-
sonable care and has failed to live up to that duty, thereby caus-
ing foreseeable injury, there results an action in tort.55
B. Contractual Exculpatory Clauses
Absent a statute or public policy to the contrary, a con-
tracting party may use an exculpatory clause to exempt itself
from the consequences of its own ordinary negligence if the con-
tractual language limiting liability is clear and unambiguous.5 6
49. Id. at 225-26, 556 N.E.2d at 1095-96, 557 N.Y.S.2d at 288-89.
50. 76 N.Y.2d 220, 225-26, 556 N.E.2d 1093, 1095-96, 557 N.Y.S.2d 286, 289
(1990).
51. Eaves, 76 N.Y.2d at 222, 556 N.E.2d at 1094, 557 N.Y.S.2d at 287.
52. Id. at 225-26, 556 N.E.2d at 1095-96, 557 N.Y.S.2d at 288-89 (citing criti-
cism that "the line between misfeasance and nonfeasance is difficult to draw," and
declining to make such an attempt). "An inspection that fails to uncover a defect
could be labeled either misfeasance for negligent performance of the inspection or
nonfeasance for failure to conduct some procedure that would have revealed the
defect. There is no founded reason why liability should depend on such seman-
tics." Id. at 226, 556 N.E.2d at 1096, 557 N.Y.S.2d at 289.
53. Id. at 226, 556 N.E.2d at 1096, 557 N.Y.S.2d at 289.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. See Kirshenbaum v. General Outdoor Advertising Co., 258 N.Y. 489, 495,
180 N.E. 245, 247 (1932) (enforcing clause relieving landlord from liability);
Graves v. Davis, 235 N.Y. 315, 319-20, 139 N.E. 280, 281 (1923) (enforcing clause
restricting liability of tug owners).
549
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The intention of the parties must be expressed in "unmistaka-
ble language" in order for the exculpatory clause to insulate a
party from liability.57 In addition, limitations of liability may be
valid notwithstanding a statute or public policy to the contrary,
where the subscriber is given a voluntary choice of obtaining
full or limited liability.58 The New York courts have previously
upheld alarm contract limitation of liability clauses in cases of
ordinary negligence. 59
However, public policy dictates that a party not be permit-
ted to insulate itself from damages caused by gross negligence.
60
In Kalisch-Jarcho, Inc. v. City of New York, 61 a heating and air
conditioning contractor that worked on a New York City munic-
ipal construction project sued the city for three million dollars
in damages caused by delays and cost overruns.6 2 The New
York Court of Appeals reversed the lower court judgment for
the plaintiff, holding that endless revisions and the city's mis-
management of the prime contractors, which plaintiff claimed
caused the overruns, would have to be deemed willful or grossly
negligent before the court could override an exculpatory clause
in their contract.63 The court stated that "an exculpatory clause
is unenforceable when .. .the misconduct for which it would
57. Gross v. Sweet, 49 N.Y.2d 102, 107, 400 N.E.2d 306, 309, 424 N.Y.S.2d
365, 368 (1979); see also Ciofalo v. Vic Tanney Gyms, 10 N.Y.2d 294, 297, 177
N.E.2d 925, 926, 220 N.Y.S.2d 962, 964 (1961) (contractual language limiting lia-
bility must be "sufficiently clear and unequivocal"); Boll v. Sharp & Dohme, 281
A.D. 568, 570-71, 121 N.Y.S.2d 20, 22 (1st Dep't 1953), aff'd, 307 N.Y. 646, 120
N.E.2d 836 (1954) (contractual language limiting liability must be "clear and
explicit").
58. Where there is no opportunity for an alarm system subscriber to pay an
annual service charge providing for full liability recovery, a contractual limitation
of liability clause will be deemed invalid. Melodee Lane Lingerie Co. v. American
Dist. Tel. Co., 18 N.Y.2d 57, 69-70, 218 N.E.2d 661, 667-68, 271 N.Y.S.2d 937, 946
(1966) (limitation of liability clause declared invalid because there was no opportu-
nity for full liability recovery).
59. Florence v. Merchants Cent. Alarm Co., 51 N.Y.2d 793, 795, 412 N.E.2d
1317, 1318, 433 N.Y.S.2d 91, 92 (1980) (enforcing a contractual clause that limited
liability to $50 as liquidated damages in the event that the burglar alarm failed).
60. Kalisch-Jarcho, Inc. v. City of New York, 58 N.Y.2d 377, 384-85, 448
N.E.2d 413, 416-17, 461 N.Y.S.2d 746, 749-50 (1983) (exculpatory agreement was
unenforceable against claims of willful or gross negligence due to public policy).
61. 58 N.Y.2d 377, 448 N.E.2d 413, 461 N.Y.S.2d 746 (1983).
62. Id. at 381, 448 N.E.2d at 414, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 747.
63. Id. at 385-86, 448 N.E.2d at 417-18, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 750-51.
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grant immunity smacks of intentional wrongdoing."4 The court
in Kalisch explained that gross negligence is conduct which "be-
tokens a reckless indifference to the rights of others" 5 and,
therefore, renders a contractual exculpatory clause unenforce-
able. 66 Since public policy condemns such conduct, even if the
contracting parties sought to be exculpated for that specific con-
duct, the exculpatory clause will be unenforceable. 67
The New York Legislature has also resolved that a limita-
tion of liability does not apply where the party seeking to en-
force the limitation acted with "reckless disregard for the safety
of others."68 Tortfeasors that act with "reckless disregard for
the safety of others" are barred from taking advantage of New
York Civil Practice Law and Rules (CPLR) 1601, which limits
liability where joint tortfeasors are found to be less than fifty
percent at fault.69
Recently, in Hanover Insurance Co. v. D & W Central Sta-
tion Alarm Co. ,70 the Supreme Court, Appellate Division held
that public policy precludes exemption from liability for grossly
negligent acts, even where there is a provision in the contract
64. Id. at 385, 448 N.E.2d at 416, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 750.
65. Id. at 385, 448 N.E.2d at 417, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 750.
66. Id.
67. Id.; see also Peckham Rd. Co. v. State of New York, 32 A.D.2d 139, 141-42,
300 N.Y.S.2d 174, 177 (3d Dep't 1969), aff'd, 28 N.Y.2d 734, 269 N.E.2d 826, 321
N.Y.S.2d 117 (1971) (stating that if a party's conduct amounts to "active interfer-
ence," an exculpatory clause will not be enforceable); Johnson v. City of New York,
191 A.D. 205, 181 N.Y.S. 137 (2d Dep't 1920), aff'd, 231 N.Y. 564, 132 N.E. 890
(1921) (determining that an exculpatory clause cannot be construed to permit an
unreasonable and unjust result, despite the parties' intent).
68. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. 1602(7) (McKinney 1976 & Supp. 1994).
69. N.Y. Civ. PR~c. L. & R. 1601(1) & 1602(7). Article 16 of the New York
CPLR is a relatively new law that alters the traditional joint and several liability
rule. Joint and several liability means that each tortfeasor will not only be liable
for the portion of the damages he caused (several liability), but also for the portion
of the damages other tortfeasors caused (joint liability). DAVID D. SIEGEL, NEW
YoRK PRACTIE § 168A, at 247 (2d ed. 1991). Section 1601(1) of the CPLR allows
tortfeasors that are found to have "fifty percent or less of the total liability" to be
only severally liable. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. 1601(1). Thus, the tortfeasor that is
50% or less responsible will be liable only for damages proportional to his culpabil-
ity. However, this culpability-based limitation of liability is subject to many excep-
tions listed under CPLR 1602, one of which is that tortfeasors acting with a
"reckless disregard for the safety of others" are jointly and severally liable for the
damage they cause. N.Y. Crv. PRAc. L. & R. 1602(7).
70. 164 A.D.2d 112, 560 N.Y.S.2d 293 (1st Dep't 1990).
9
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that purports to limit liability for negligence. 71 In Hanover, a
subscriber to a central station alarm monitoring service sued
the contractor providing the service after a burglary loss.7 2 The
contract provided that if loss occurred due to equipment failure,
fire, smoke, etc., "regardless of whether or not such loss, dam-
age or personal injury was caused by or contributed to by les-
sor's [alarm monitoring service's] negligent performance or
failure to perform any obligation under" the contract, the alarm
monitoring service's liability would be severely limited.7 3 The
court held that the limitation of liability clause in the central
station alarm contract would not be enforceable against acts of
gross negligence. 74
C. Contribution
Contribution is a doctrine based on equity and justice.7 5
Contribution arises from the rule of law that tortfeasors gener-
ally are jointly and severally liable for a judgment-each is re-
sponsible for the full amount regardless of culpability.7 6 Under
the doctrine of contribution, a tortfeasor who has paid more
than his proportionate share of liability joins and seeks recov-
ery from another tortfeasor who was partly liable to the
plaintiff.77
Contribution did not exist at common law.78 At common
law, "the wrongdoer selected by the injured party for suit must
have succeeded in avoiding any part of responsibility;... other-
71. Id. at 115, 560 N.Y.S.2d at 295.
72. Id. at 113-14, 560 N.Y.S.2d at 294.
73. Id. at 114, 560 N.Y.S.2d at 295.
74. Id. at 115, 560 N.Y.S.2d at 295-96.
75. Professional Beauty Supply v. National Beauty Supply, 594 F.2d 1179,
1185 (8th Cir. 1979) (defining contribution as "an equitable doctrine based on the
principle of justice between the parties"); Vickers Petroleum Co. v. Biffle, 239 F.2d
602, 606 (10th Cir. 1956) (defining contribution as an equitable doctrine based on
principles of fundamental justice).
76. See Professional Beauty Supply, 594 F.2d at 1185; Vickers Petroleum, 239
F.2d at 606.
77. Green Bus Lines v. Consolidated Mutual Ins. Co., 74 A.D.2d 136, 147-48,
426 N.Y.S.2d 981, 989-90 (2d Dep't 1980).
78. Merryweather v. Nixan, 101 Eng. Rep. 1337 (K.B. 1799) (holding that
there is no right of contribution among joint tortfeasors whether negligent or in-
tentional). For a discussion of the historical background of contribution, see Kevin
J. Grehan, Note, Comparative Negligence, 81 CoLUM. L. REv. 1668, 1690-1701
(1981).
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wise he would have to assume all of it without redress."7 9 One
reason for the common law's abhorrence of contribution was the
policy that a wrongdoer should not be entitled to seek relief
from the court.80 A second reason was the premise that parties
should continue to file pleadings until they have defined an is-
sue with a yes or no answer, limiting the recovery to either all
or nothing.8'
In New York, historically, loss was apportioned between
joint tortfeasors by statute as well as through case law. Under
former CPLR 1401, loss was apportioned between wrongdoers
pro rata, but not in proportion to fault.82 It allowed one joint
tortfeasor subject to judgment to compel equal contribution by
another joint tortfeasor subject to the same judgment.83 How-
ever, the statute did not confer a right to defendants to implead
other wrongdoers, and basically left it up to plaintiff to sue all
wrongdoers.8 4 Because of its restrictions, the statute proved to
be an ineffective attempt to apportion loss and was repealed. 85
Case law also attempted to apportion loss between joint
tortfeasors. For example, New York courts developed an active-
passive negligence concept. 86 The active-passive concept pro-
vided that a passively negligent defendant could implead an ac-
79. Dole v. Dow Chem. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 148, 282 N.E.2d 288, 291, 331
N.Y.S.2d 382, 386 (1972).
80. John W. Wade, Should Joint and Several Liability of Multiple Tortfeasors
Be Abolished?, 10 AM. J. TRIAL ADvoc. 193, 196 (1986). See Green Bus Lines, 74
A.D.2d at 148, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 990 (explaining that under common law it was
against public policy to allow a wrongdoer to plead his own tort as part of his cause
of action) (citing Gilbert v. Finch, 173 N.Y. 455, 462, 66 N.E. 133, 135 (1936)).
81. Wade, supra note 80, at n.5.
82. Act of Apr. 4, 1962, ch. 308, § 1401, 1962 N.Y. Laws 1344, amended by Act
of Apr. 10, 1964, ch. 388, § 5, 1964 N.Y. Laws 1256, repealed by Act of June 7, 1974,
ch. 742, § 1, 1974 N.Y. Laws 1915.
83. Dole, 30 N.Y.2d at 148, 282 N.E.2d at 291, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 386.
84. See Act of Apr. 4, 1962, ch. 308, § 1401, 1962 N.Y. Laws 1344.
85. See Act of Apr. 4, 1962, ch. 308, § 1401, 1962 N.Y. Laws 1344, repealed by
Act of June 7, 1974, ch. 742, § 1, 1974 N.Y. Laws 1915.
86. Jackson v. Associated Dry Goods Corp., 13 N.Y.2d 112, 116, 192 N.E.2d
167, 169, 242 N.Y.S.2d 210, 213 (1963) (finding defendant store owner not guilty of
active negligence, therefore permitting defendant store owner to recover contribu-
tion from another defendant); see also Jordan v. Madison Leasing Co., 596 F. Supp.
707, 709 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (utilizing a primary-secondary liability concept, similar to
the active-passive negligence concept, in order to determine if indemnity or appor-
tionment is proper between joint tortfeasors).
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tively negligent tortfeasor.8 7 This attempt to apportion loss
simply provided for a shift in the blame. If the blame were suc-
cessfully shifted from a passively negligent tortfeasor to an ac-
tively negligent tortfeasor, the actively negligent tortfeasor
would be fully liable for the judgment. Because this system
only provided for shifting blame, rather than apportioning it be-
tween two or more wrongdoers, it also ultimately failed.88
Then came the landmark decision of Dole v. Dow Chemical
Co.8 9 In Dole, the administratrix of the estate of a deceased em-
ployee brought an action against Dow Chemical Company
("Dow") for negligently causing the employee's death.90 The em-
ployee died while cleaning employer's grain storage bin.91 The
grain storage bin had recently been fumigated with methyl bro-
mide, a poisonous fumigant used to control storage insects and
mites. 92 The fumigant was produced by Dow.93 The administra-
trix alleged that Dow was negligent in failing to properly label
the fumigant.94
Dow asserted a third-party claim against the employer for
breach of an alleged independent duty owed to it by the em-
ployer.95 The New York Court of Appeals held that Dow would
be permitted to maintain its third-party complaint against the
employer for apportionment of damages.96 Thus, the decision in
Dole gave rise to the rule of contribution in New York.97 The
87. Dole, 30 N.Y.2d at 148, 282 N.E.2d at 291-92, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 387.
88. Id. at 147-48, 282 N.E.2d at 291, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 386-87.
89. 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382.
90. Id. at 145-46, 282 N.E.2d at 290, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 384-85.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 146, 282 N.E.2d at 290, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 385.
95. Id. at 152, 282 N.E.2d at 294, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 390.
96. Id. at 153, 282 N.E.2d at 295, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 391-92. Subsequent cases
have embraced the principles in Dole, allowing third-party actions for an appor-
tionment of responsibility among the parties. See, e.g., Jordan v. Madison Leasing
Co., 596 F. Supp. 707, 709 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (citing Dole as authority for apportion-
ment of responsibility among the parties); Green Bus Lines, 74 A.D.2d at 153, 426
N.Y.S.2d at 993 (allowing a Dole-type claim to be asserted in a third-party action
resulting in equitable apportionment between the joint tortfeasors based upon
their relative degrees of fault in causing the injuries complained of by the prime
plaintiff).
97. Dole, 30 N.Y.2d at 153, 282 N.E:2d at 295, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 391-92.
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goal of the Dole rule is equitable loss sharing by all the wrong-
doers, and thus, fairness to tortfeasors who are jointly liable.98
The holding in Dole was subsequently codified at CPLR ar-
ticle 14. 99 The statute states that a tortfeasor that pays more
than his fair share of the judgment may recover the excess from
other joint tortfeasors. 100 In addition, a defendant may assert a
cause of action for contribution in a separate action or in the
main action by cross-claim, counterclaim or third-party
claim. 101 Together, Dole and CPLR article 14 allow for distribu-
tion of the loss among culpable parties in accordance with their
relative degrees of fault. 102
III. Sommer v. Federal Signal Corp.10 3
A. Facts
Plaintiff, 810 Associates ("Associates"), owned a forty-two
story building in midtown Manhattan, which was equipped
with a central station fire alarm system. 1°4 Associates entered
into a contract with Holmes Protection, Inc. ("Holmes"), a fire
alarm monitoring company, to obtain a central station monitor-
ing service. 10 5 Holmes would receive signals of any alarms
sounded on the premises of Associates and would notify the fire
department accordingly. 10 6 This contract included an exculpa-
tory clause that read as follows: "Holmes shall not be liable for
any of [Associates's] losses or damages ... caused by perform-
98. Id. at 150, 282 N.E.2d at 293, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 389.
99. N.Y. Crv. PRAc. L. & R. art. 14 (McKinney 1976 & Supp. 1994).
100. N.Y. Cry. PRAc. L. & R. 1401-02 (McKinney 1976 & Supp. 1994). "[Tlwo
or more persons who are subject to liability for damages for the same personal
injury, injury to property or wrongful death, may claim contribution among them."
Id.
101. N.Y. Crv. PaAc. L. & R. 1403 (McKinney 1976 & Supp. 1994). "A cause of
action for contribution may be asserted in a separate action or by cross-claim,
counterclaim or third-party claim in a pending action." Id.
102. See Dole, 30 N.Y.2d at 148-49, 282 N.E.2d at 291-92, 331 N.Y.S.2d at
386-87; N.Y. CIv. PRAc. L. & R. 1402 (McKinney 1976 & Supp. 1994). "The amount
of contribution to which a person is entitled shall be the excess paid by him over
and above his equitable share of the judgment recovered by the injured party ....
The equitable shares shall be determined in accordance with the relative culpabil-
ity of each person liable for contribution." Id.
103. 79 N.Y.2d 540, 593 N.E.2d 1365, 583 N.Y.S.2d 957 (1992).
104. Id. at 548, 593 N.E.2d at 1367, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 959.
105. Id.
106. Id.
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ance or non-performance of obligations imposed by this contract
or by negligent acts or omissions by Holmes."10 7 The contract
also included a clause that limited liability to "the lesser of $250
or 10% of the annual service charge as liquidated damages."10 8
On April 13, 1985, at 8:58 a.m., Associates called Holmes to
request temporary deactivation of the alarm system. 0 9 Once
the system was "deactivated," Holmes would continue to receive
alarm signals, but would not report them to the fire depart-
ment. 10 Holmes's policy was to restore normal alarm service
within eight to twelve hours unless otherwise requested."' In
accordance with its policy, Holmes reactivated the alarm moni-
toring service at 8:58 p.m. on April 13.112
At 7:58 a.m., on April 15, Associates called Holmes to verify
reactivation of the system."13 Holmes's dispatcher, "allegedly
an untrained inexperienced substitute,"" 4 became confused by
the request of reactivation since the system had already been
reactivated on April 13.1 5 Without attempting to clarify the sit-
uation, the dispatcher assumed that Associates was requesting
deactivation. 116
Approximately eight minutes later, Holmes began receiving
alarm signals from Associates." 7 The dispatcher ignored the
signals, believing that the service was "deactivated."" 8 How-
ever, a four-alarm fire had started on the 28th floor and was
reported by others directly to the fire department." 9 The re-
107. Id. at 549, 593 N.E.2d at 1368, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 960.
108. Id.
109. Sommer v. Federal Signal Corp., 174 A.D.2d 440, 441, 571 N.Y.S.2d 228,
229 (1st Dep't 1991). The alarm system was temporarily deactivated because work
was being done on the building. Sommer, 79 N.Y.2d at 548, 593 N.E.2d at 1367,
583 N.Y.S.2d at 959.
110. Sommer, 79 N.Y.2d at 548, 583 N.E.2d at 1367, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 959.
111. Id.
112. Id.; Sommer, 174 A.D.2d at 441, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 229-30.
113. Sommer, 174 A.D.2d at 441, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 230.
114. Sommer, 79 N.Y.2d at 548-49, 593 N.E.2d at 1367, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 959.
115. Id. at 549, 593 N.E.2d at 1367, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 959.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. The fire caused over $7 million worth of damages. Id. at 549, 593
N.E.2d at 1368, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 960.
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ports were made minutes after Holmes began receiving
signals. 120
B. Procedural History
1. The Decision of the Supreme Court, New York County
Associates sued Holmes contending that the fire detection
system failed to detect the fire in a timely manner and the fire
further spread due to Holmes's failure to transmit the alarm to
the fire department. 121 Several actions ensued. 122 Associates
sued Holmes, 23 claiming that Holmes's breach of contract and
Holmes's grossly negligent breach of a duty of reasonable care
resulted in over seven million dollars in damages. 24 Associates
also sued Holmes under strict tort liability and breach of war-
ranty theories. 125 Associates sued alarm-related entities-de-
signers, manufacturers, parts suppliers, installers, and
inspectors of the fire detection system-under similar theories
because the fire detection system failed to detect the fire in a
timely manner. 26 Tenants of the building sued both Associates
and Holmes for damage to their property. 27 Tenants of the
building also sued the other alarm-related entities. 128 Associ-
ates and the alarm-related entities all sought contribution from
Holmes. 129 These actions were consolidated into one action. 30
At the close of pleadings, the Supreme Court of New York
County granted Holmes's motion for summary judgment and
dismissed all complaints, cross-claims, counterclaims and third-
party claims against Holmes.' 3 ' The court concluded that no ev-
identiary facts were asserted sufficient to raise a material, tria-
ble issue of fact as to whether Holmes's actions constituted
gross negligence. 32 The court reasoned that, due to the con-
120. Id. at 549, 593 N.E.2d at 1367, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 959.
121. Id. at 549, 593 N.E.2d at 1368, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 960.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 550 n.1, 593 N.E.2d at 1368 n.1, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 960 n.l.
126. Id. at 549, 593 N.E.2d at 1368, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 960.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Sommer, 174 A.D.2d at 441-42, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 230.
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tract's exculpatory clause, only gross negligence would support
an action. 3 3 The court dismissed the action, determining that
the only questions raised regarded ordinary negligence, liability
for which was precluded by the exculpatory clause. 34
2. The Decision of the Supreme Court, Appellate Division
The first department of the appellate division reversed the
trial court, holding that a genuine issue of material fact existed
as to whether Holmes was grossly negligent in failing to re-
spond to alarm signals, thus precluding summary judgment. 135
The court reaffirmed the holding of Hanover Insurance Co. v. D
& W Central Station Alarm Co.,136 which stated that public pol-
icy precludes exemption from liability in the case of gross negli-
gence. 137 The appellate court opined that the record in this case
suggested that triable issues of fact existed as to whether
Holmes was grossly negligent in its failure to respond to alarm
signals received from Associates's building. 138 The first depart-
ment remanded and ordered that the contribution claims be re-
instated if Holmes were found to be grossly negligent.139
C. The Decision of the New York Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals agreed with the appellate division's
determination that there was a triable issue of fact as to gross
negligence, but concluded that the appellate division erred in its
contribution analysis. 140 The Court of Appeals first determined
that Associates could pursue both tort claims and contract
claims against Holmes.' 4 ' The court found that Holmes's duty
to exercise reasonable care stemmed from Holmes's contract
with Associates and from the nature of its services.142
133. Id.
134. Sommer, 79 N.Y.2d at 549-50, 593 N.E.2d at 1368, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 960.
135. Sommer, 174 A.D.2d at 442, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 230.
136. 164 A.D.2d 112, 560 N.Y.S.2d 293 (1st Dep't 1990).
137. Sommer, 174 A.D.2d at 440, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 229; see Hanover, 164
A.D.2d at 115, 560 N.Y.S.2d at 295; supra notes 70-74 and accompanying text.
138. Sommer, 174 A.D.2d at 442, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 230. The court considered
in the record the tape and transcript of the conversation recorded between Associ-
ates's chief engineer and the Holmes dispatcher. Id.
139. Id. at 440, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 229.
140. Sommer, 79 N.Y.2d at 550, 593 N.E.2d at 1368, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 960.
141. Id. at 552, 593 N.E.2d at 1370, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 962.
142. Id.
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A fire alarm monitoring company's service protects a signif-
icant public interest because "failure to perform the service
carefully and competently can have catastrophic conse-
quences."143 Accordingly, Holmes had a duty to exercise reason-
able care independent of the Holmes-Associates contract.'"
The court noted that breach of this duty, combined with the tor-
tious nature of the injuries and the "abrupt cataclysmic" nature
of the occurrence supported a tort action against Holmes. 145
The Court of Appeals affirmed the appellate division's hold-
ing that the contractual exculpatory clauses would be enforcea-
ble against claims of ordinary negligence, 46 but not against
claims of gross negligence. 147 The court also affirmed the appel-
late division's reversal of the trial court's grant of summary
judgment in Holmes's favor.'4 The Court of Appeals reasoned
that it would be for a jury to decide whether Holmes's actions
were "a simple mistake or reckless indifference." 49
143. Id. at 553, 593 N.E.2d at 1370, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 962.
144. Id.
145. Id.; see supra notes 39-44 and accompanying text.
146. Sommer, 79 N.Y.2d at 554, 593 N.E.2d at 1371, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 963.
Compare Melodee Lane Lingerie Co. v. American Dist. Tel. Co., 18 N.Y.2d 57, 218
N.E.2d 661, 271 N.Y.S.2d 937 (1966) (holding that, in the absence of a statute, a
contracting party could exempt itself from the consequences of its own ordinary
negligence if the language so specifies, yet holding that the limitation of liability
was improper for other reasons); Ciofalo v. Vic Tanney Gyms, 10 N.Y.2d 294, 177
N.E.2d 925, 220 N.Y.S.2d 962 (1961) (slip and fall case where the court upheld a
gymnasium membership agreement that clearly expressed the parties' intent to
completely insulate the defendant from liability for injuries due to the defendant's
ordinary negligence).
147. Sommer, 79 N.Y.2d at 554, 593 N.E.2d at 1370-71, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 963.
Compare Kalisch-Jarcho, Inc. v. City of New York, 58 N.Y.2d 377, 448 N.E.2d 413,
461 N.Y.S.2d 746 (1983) (city could be liable to contractor for project delays only if
delays were caused by city's gross negligence or bad faith). "[Aln exculpatory
agreement, no matter how flat and unqualified its terms, will not exonerate a
party from liability under all circumstances. Under announced public policy, it
will not apply to exemption of willful or grossly negligent acts." Id. at 384-85, 448
N.E.2d at 416, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 749.
148. Sommer, 79 N.Y.2d at 560, 593 N.E.2d at 1375, 583 N.E.2d at 967.
149. Id. at 555, 593 N.E.2d at 1371, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 963-64. Courts have
explained that, "[t]o grant summary judgment it must clearly appear that no mate-
rial and triable issue of fact is presented." Sillman v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film
Corp., 3 N.Y.2d 395, 404, 144 N.E.2d 387, 392, 165 N.Y.S.2d 498, 505 (1957). But
see David Gutter Furs v. Jewelers Protection Servs., Ltd., 79 N.Y.2d 1027, 594
N.E.2d 924, 584 N.Y.S.2d 430 (1992) (holding that no issue of fact was raised as to
whether alarm company performed its duties in a grossly negligent manner, so as
to render contractual exculpatory clauses unenforceable).
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The Court of Appeals next addressed the two classes of con-
tribution claims brought against Holmes.150 First, the alarm-
related defendants sought contribution from Holmes in the
event that they were found liable to Associates. 151 Even though
contribution has been held unavailable in contract cases, 152 the
court held that contribution would not be barred153 because
Holmes's actions sounded in tort.154 The court also determined
that it was immaterial whether Holmes owed a duty to the
alarm-related defendants. 55 What was material was that
Holmes owed a duty to exercise reasonable care to the injured
party, Associates. 156
The critical question for the court was whether contribution
could be activated upon a finding of ordinary negligence or only
upon a finding of gross negligence.157 The court found that,
although the exculpatory clause precluded Holmes's liability to
Associates for ordinary negligence, the clause did not preclude
liability to others for ordinary negligence. 158 The clause was
like a "special defense" specific to Associates. 159 Because the
alarm-related defendants were not parties to the Holmes-Asso-
ciates contract, they should not be bound by its exculpatory
clause. 60 Therefore, the alarm-related defendants' contribution
150. Sommer, 79 N.Y.2d at 555-60, 593 N.E.2d at 1372-75, 583 N.Y.S.2d at
964-67.
151. Id. at 555-58, 593 N.E.2d at 1372-74, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 964-66.
152. Board of Educ. v. Sargent, Webster, Crenshaw & Folley, 71 N.Y.2d 21,
29, 517 N.E.2d 1360, 1365, 523 N.Y.S.2d 475, 479 (1988).
153. Sommer, 79 N.Y.2d at 558, 593 N.E.2d at 1373, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 965-66.
Compare Sargent, 71 N.Y.2d at 21, 517 N.E.2d at 1360, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 475.
154. See supra notes 144-45 and accompanying text.
155. Sommer, 79 N.Y.2d at 557-58, 593 N.E.2d at 1373, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 965.
156. Sommer, 79 N.Y.2d at 558, 593 N.E.2d at 1373, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 965; see
also id. at 557, 593 N.E.2d at 1373, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 965 ("The rule of apportion-
ment applies when two or more tort-feasors have shared.., in the responsibility
by their conduct or omissions in causing an accident, in violation of the duties they
respectively owed to the injured person." (quoting Rogers v. Dorchester Assocs., 32
N.Y.2d 553, 564, 300 N.E.2d 403, 409, 347 N.Y.S.2d 22, 31 (1973))).
157. Sommer, 79 N.Y.2d at 558, 593 N.E.2d at 1373, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 965.
158. Id. at 558, 593 N.E.2d at 1373-74, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 965-66.
159. Id.
160. Id.; see also Franzek v. Calspan Corp., 78 A.D.2d 134, 434 N.Y.S.2d 288
(4th Dep't 1980) (holding that pre-accident release of claims by passengers to river
trip promoter did not insulate promoter from contribution claims by parties also
sued by passenger).
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claims against Holmes would be triggered upon a finding of or-
dinary negligence. 161
In the second class of contribution claims, the court ad-
dressed Associates's action against Holmes, seeking contribu-
tion for the claims brought by the tenants against Associates. 162
The court reasoned that, although contribution is usually
founded upon a breach of a duty owed to the plaintiff, it may
also be based upon a duty owed to the defendant. 163 Because
Holmes had a duty to Associates, Holmes would be required to
contribute for any recovery by the tenants against Associates.'"
However, the court again examined the issue of whether this
contribution action would be triggered upon a finding of ordi-
nary negligence or only upon a finding of gross negligence. 6 5
The court found that, because Holmes's exculpatory clause was
enforceable against Associates as to ordinary negligence, Asso-
ciates's contribution claim against Holmes would be triggered
only upon a finding of gross negligence. 166
In summary, the court held that public policy required
Holmes to be liable to Associates for gross negligence, 167 and
that an issue of fact existed as to whether Holmes met this
threshold. 68 Accordingly, the Court of Appeals held that the
appellate division correctly denied summary judgment for
Holmes. 169 As to the claims by Associates against the alarm-
related defendants, Holmes would be liable for contribution
upon a showing of ordinary negligence, because Holmes could
161. Sommer, 79 N.Y.2d at 558, 593 N.E.2d at 1373, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 965-66.
162. Id. at 558-60, 593 N.E.2d at 1374-75, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 966-67.
163. Id. at 559, 593 N.E.2d at 1374, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 966; see also id. ("If an
independent obligation can be found on the part of a concurrent wrongdoer to pre-
vent foreseeable harm, he should be held responsible for the portion of the damage
attributable to his negligence, despite the fact that the duty violated was not one
owing directly to the injured party." (quoting Garrett v. Holiday Inns, 58 N.Y.2d
253, 261, 447 N.E.2d 717, 721, 460 N.Y.S.2d 774, 778 (1983))).
164. Sommer, 79 N.Y.2d at 559, 593 N.E.2d at 1374, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 966.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 559-60, 593 N.E.2d at 1374, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 966; see Melodee Lane
Lingerie Co. v. American Dist. Tel. Co., 18 N.Y.2d 57, 218 N.E.2d 661, 271
N.Y.S.2d 937 (1966) (holding that where a company's contractual clause limiting
liability was held to be unenforceable, customer's right to indemnification was
unaffected).
167. Sommer, 79 N.Y.2d at 560, 593 N.E.2d at 1374, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 966.
168. Id. at 548, 593 N.E.2d at 1367; 583 N.Y.S.2d at 959.
169. Id. at 560, 593 N.E.2d at 1374, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 967.
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not rely on an exculpatory clause against one not a party to the
contract. 170 Because Associates was a party to the contract, As-
sociates could only obtain contribution against Holmes if
Holmes's conduct was grossly negligent. 171 Actions by the
alarm-related defendants against Holmes for contribution from
the tenant's claims were properly dismissed, because Holmes
owed no duty to either of them.172
IV. Analysis
A. Tort/ Contract Borderland
The New York courts have wrestled with the tort/contract
borderland, attempting to develop rules and tests to clarify the
confusion. 173 The Court of Appeals' analysis of the borderland
in Sommer v. Federal Signal Corp. 174 was a logical and positive
step in the right direction. The opinion sets forth clear guide-
lines for trial courts to follow as they navigate through the
borderland.
In Sommer, the Court of Appeals found that the facts gave
rise to actions in tort as well as in contract. 175 The court
avoided the traditional labels of nonfeasance and misfea-
sance. 176 If the court had applied these labels, most likely
Holmes's failure to respond to an alarm signal would have been
characterized as nonfeasance, allowing only for an action in con-
tract.177 Instead, the court reasoned that the fire alarm moni-
toring services affected a great public interest.178 Fire alarm
monitoring service providers have a duty to perform the serv-
ices carefully, because failure to do so could cost many lives and
170. Id. at 558, 593 N.E.2d at 1373, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 965-66.
171. Id. at 560, 593 N.E.2d at 1375, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 967.
172. Id. at 558, 593 N.E.2d at 1374, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 966.
173. Bellevue S. Assocs. v. H.R.H. Constr. Corp., 78 N.Y.2d 282, 579 N.E.2d
195, 574 N.Y.S.2d 165 (1991); Clark-Fitzpatrick Inc. v. Long Island R.R., 70 N.Y.2d
382, 516 N.E.2d 190, 521 N.Y.S.2d 653 (1987); World Trade Knitting Mills v. Lido
Knitting Mills, 154 A.D.2d 99, 551 N.Y.S.2d 930 (1st Dep't 1990).
174. 79 N.Y.2d 540, 593 N.E.2d 1365, 583 N.Y.S.2d 957 (1992).
175. Sommer, 79 N.Y.2d at 553, 593 N.E.2d at 1370, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 962; see
supra notes 141-45 and accompanying text.
176. Sommer, 79 N.Y.2d at 553, 593 N.E.2d at 1370, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 962.
177. See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
178. Sommer, 79 N.Y.2d at 553, 593 N.E.2d at 1370, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 962.
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great expense to property. 179 Accordingly, the court imposed a
duty above and beyond that created by the contract. 180
Significantly, the court permitted claims in tort because
this, in turn, cleared the way for contribution claims.' 8 ' By al-
lowing the action to proceed in tort, the contribution claims,
otherwise unallowable, could go forward. Although the court
did not formulate a new test or a new rule to clarify the border-
land, its analysis was simple and clear, making the borderland
seem less confusing.
B. Exculpatory Clauses
The court's decision that exculpatory clauses shall be unen-
forceable against claims of gross negligence was well supported
by case law and public policy.18 2 Where there is an exculpatory
clause in a contract, the parties should be bound to it so long as
there is only ordinary negligence.18 3 Associates voluntarily
chose to enter into the contract, which included the exculpatory
clause, and should have been bound to its terms.'84
However, where there is a finding of gross negligence, ex-
culpatory clauses will be unenforceable. 85 Public policy dic-
tates that liability for conduct evincing a reckless disregard for
the safety of others will not be excused by an exculpatory
clause. Therefore, Holmes could not escape liability where it
has been grossly negligent. This public policy encourages enti-
179. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
180. Sommer, 79 N.Y.2d at 553, 593 N.E.2d at 1370, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 962.
Subsequent to this decision, the first department applied the reasoning found in
Sommer in another context. The potential consequences to pedestrians of a defec-
tive building facade were held to create a duty of due care for the contractor, in-
dependent from its contractual obligation. Trustees of Columbia Univ. v.
Gwathmey Siegel & Assocs. Architects, 192 A.D.2d 151, 601 N.Y.S.2d 116 (1st
Dep't 1993).
181. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
182. See, e.g., Kalisch-Jarcho, Inc. v. City of New York, 58 N.Y.2d 377, 448
N.E.2d 413, 461 N.Y.S.2d 746 (1983).
183. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
184. See supra notes 105-08 and accompanying text.
185. Sommer, 79 N.Y.2d at 554, 593 N.E.2d at 1370-71, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 963.
This standard was followed in a 1993 decision of the Court of Appeals. The court
held that the exculpatory clause of a burglary alarm service contract was enforcea-
ble because failure to wire a skylight of an art gallery, from which burglars entered
and escaped, did not amount to gross negligence. Colnaghi, U.S.A., Ltd. v. Jewel-
ers Protection Servs., 81 N.Y.2d 821, 611 N.E.2d 282, 595 N.Y.S.2d 381 (1993).
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ties with responsibilities that have a significant impact on the
general public to avoid gross negligence. This decision will fur-
ther encourage fire, burglar and other alarm services to be more
careful with the lives and property that their services protect.
C. Contribution Claims
Ever since the pro-plaintiff principle of joint and several lia-
bility was first recognized, the courts and legislature have at-
tempted to promote an equivalent fairness to joint
tortfeasors 8 6 Because the doctrine of joint and several liability
may require a defendant to pay 100% of the damages (even if
not found to be 100% at fault), fairness to joint tortfeasors re-
quires that the courts allow for as much contribution as possi-
ble. It is more equitable to allow our adversarial system to
determine the percent of liability rather than to impose the full
amount of damages on one of many joint tortfeasors 8 7
The rules of contribution outlined by the decision result in
a just outcome for both plaintiffs and defendants. The result
that Associates could recover for contribution from Holmes, only
if Holmes was found to be grossly negligent, 88 is just; Associ-
ates should be bound by its contract and should not be able to
recover for ordinary negligence. Consistent with the analysis of
Associates's direct claim against Holmes, Associates chose to
enter into the contract and must abide by its clauses. However,
public policy dictates that exculpatory clauses be unenforceable
against gross negligence. 8 9 Therefore, it is fair to allow Associ-
ates to recover for contribution from Holmes only if Holmes was
grossly negligent.
In the action by Associates against the alarm-related de-
fendants, the alarm-related defendants were not parties to the
contract. 90 Therefore, they should not be bound by the exculpa-
tory clause. 19' Since, under the theory of joint and several lia-
bility, the alarm-related defendants may have to pay 100% of
186. See N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. art. 14 (McKinney 1976 & Supp. 1994); Dole
v. Dow Chem. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1972).
187. Sommer, 79 N.Y.2d at 556-57, 593 N.E.2d at 1372, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 964.
188. Id. at 560, 593 N.E.2d at 1374, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 966.
189. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
190. See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
191. See supra notes 158-60 and accompanying text.
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the damages to Associates, even if not 100% at fault, it is fair
that they be able to seek contribution from Holmes in propor-
tion to Holmes's fault.
Although one may argue that allowing this contribution
based on ordinary negligence may cause inflation in rates
charged by alarm monitoring service companies, there are
stronger arguments that support such contribution. The cost of
possible litigation will be filtered to the consumer either
through the monitoring company or through the other alarm-
related entities. Therefore, it is logical to use the fairer system.
The fairer system allows an entity that has paid more than its
proportion of fault to recover in contribution from the other en-
tities at fault. Allowing this type of contribution encourages the
monitoring companies to improve their services, thereby bene-
fiting the consumer, and justifying their assumption of the in-
creased associated costs.
V. Conclusion
Although the New York Court of Appeals in Sommer v. Fed-
eral Signal Corp.192 did not invent a new rule or new test to
clarify the tort/contract borderland confusion, the court showed
how to examine the duties of the parties in light of the present
tort/contract rules in order to make a clear determination as to
whether both tort and contract claims can be pursued. The
court found that Holmes's exculpatory clause would be unen-
forceable against claims of gross negligence. This finding is im-
portant because the court reaffirmed its view that public policy
can make contract liability limitation clauses unenforceable.
The court's analysis of the contribution claims provides a
clear framework for cases involving multiple parties and multi-
ple contracts. The court allowed the contribution claims to the
extent that public policy permitted. Allowing as many contribu-
tion claims as possible ensures that, through our adversarial
system, justice will be served to the injured parties as well as to
the joint tortfeasors.
Natasha V. Konon
192. 79 N.Y.2d 540, 593 N.E.2d 1365, 583 N.Y.S.2d 957 (1992).
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